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A Theory of Collective Bargaining 
Syed M. A. HAMEED 
The author brings out the inadequacies of the présent 
theoretical models in explaining collective bargaining and 
provides the constructs of a more complète and integrated 
body of theory. He also notes the importance of using 
functional terms in a theoretical model of this kind. 
Theoretical Base 
The classical model of collective bargaining as propounded by 
Sidney and Béatrice Webb, over half a century ago, in their famous book, 
Industrial Democracy, was essentially an économie model. It defined the 
main rôle of unions as bargaining over the price of labour ; although 
this was not the only method used by trade unions in nineteenth-century 
England. According to the Webbs, unions alternatively used mutual 
insurance and légal enactment methods for obtaining various benefits 
for their members. As for collective bargaining itself, it was exclusively 
a trade union method with no implieit or explicit interest on the part 
of employers. It substituted collective will for individual bargain. The 
Webbs did not define collective bargaining but produced many examples, 
such as the one below : 
In unorganized trades the individual workman, applying for a job, 
accepts or refuses the terms offered by the employer without 
communication with his fellow-workmen, and without any considér-
ation other than the exigencies of his own position for the sale of his 
labour he makes, with the employer, a strictly individual bargain. 
But if a group of workmen concert together, and send représentatives 
to conduct the bargaining on behalf of the whole body, the position 
is at once changed. Instead of employer making a séries of separate 
contracts with isolated individuals, he meets with collective will, and 
serties, in a single agreement, the principles upon which, for the time 
being, ail workmen of a particular group, or class, or grade, will be 
engaged. 1 
1
 SIDNEY & Béatrice WEBB, Industrial 
Democracy, London, Longmans, 1902. 
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The example given above and similar others in their book, suggest 
that the Webbs conceptualized the method of collective bargaining as : 
(a) a collective équivalent and alternative to individual bargaining,2 
in which (b) the rôle of employers and their association was overlooked* 
and (c) the rule-making character of the process was not clearly stated. 
Récent critics of the Webbs' theoretical model hâve argued that individual 
bargaining can and does coexist with collective bargaining.3 Individuaî 
bargainers may hâve plenty of scope, depending upon the nature of 
labour market, to obtain wages over and above the minimum level laid 
down in the collective agreement. A more serious oversight in the Webbs* 
model is considered to be the lack of emphasis on the power relationship 
which exists in a collective bargaining situation. It is argued that fuzziness 
in the Webbs' concept of collective bargaining is removed if its two 
essential features — rule-making and power relationship — are placed 
in the proper perspective. 
Much of this criticism about the conceptual inadequacy of the Webbs* 
framework is unjustified as the institutional nature of collective bargaining 
itself has drastically changed since 1897 when they made an empirical 
observation of the trade union behavior in England. A matter of greater 
académie concern and significance, in the contemporary scène, is the 
uni-dimensional emphasis found in the Dunlop-Ross controversy, 4 To 
regard trade union behavior vis-à-vis management as primarily économie 
or political in nature is a rather unrewarding intellectual exercise as 
collective bargaining relationship is essentially kaleidoscopic. A slight 
change in psychological, économie, political or légal conditions produces 
a new intermingling of colours and a new pattern. Any attempt at 
producing typologies 5 to express thèse kaleidoscopic patterns in labour-
2
 Allan FLANDERS, « Collective Bargaining : A Theoretical Analysis », in 
British Journal of Industrial Relations, May, 1968. 
3 Allan FLANDERS, ibid. 
4 John T. DUNLOP, Wage Détermination Under Trade Unions, New York, 
Macmillan, 1944 ; Arthur M. Ross, Trade Union Wage Policy, Berkeley, University 
of California Press, 1948. 
5 « Professor Harbison suggested the concepts of 'armed trace, working har-
mony, and coopération' to identify models of différent types of collective bargaining 
relationships. » Another attempt in the same direction was made by Professor 
Selekman who « developed a more elaborate classification of bargaining types, 
including the following eight : (1) containment-agression, characterized by legalistic 
agression and défense; (2) ideological type; (3) conflict type in which there is a 
refusai to deal with the union and an attempt to get rid of or break the union ; 
(4) the power-bargaining type, relying heavily on économie force ; (5) the deal-
bargaining, characterized by a kind of 'horsetrading' behavior ; (6) collusion, whicb 
appears to imply labour-management agreements at the expense of third parties ; 
(7) accommodation, and (8) co-operation. » L. Reed TRIPP, Labor Problems and 
processes, New York, Harper and Brother, pp. 251-252. 
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management relations are grossly inadéquate in discerning the minute 
détails which are so vital in the formation of a prédictive theory of 
collective bargaining. 
A survey of literature on théories of collective bargaining is a 
remarkably unremitting task. It has cost the author a great deal of mental 
struggle to question the manner in which various théories of negotiation 
(or bargaining) hâve been described in standard text books, as théories 
of collective bargaining. It basically unmasks a disturbing feature of 
current literature in which no clarity exists on the rôle, éléments, and 
requirements of a theory of collective bargaining. Mostly, théories covered 
under the rubric of collective bargaining are actually théories of nego-
tiation ; whereas negotiation is only one of the features of collective 
bargaining. Its other intégral components are employée organization into 
unions, duly certified as bargaining agents ; employer associations, if any, 
and the socio-economic and légal sanctions in the form of permissive 
strikes or lock-outs. A theory which explakis only one or two of thèse 
éléments is not a theory of collective bargaining. It is at best a partial 
or inadéquate theory. Consider, for example, the following théories and 
models which are, with the exception of Chamberlain's model, partial 
approaches. (1) Bilatéral Monopoly Theory (2) The Pen Model (3) The 
Stevens-Somers Model (4) The Chamberlain Model. Only the first one 
is explained below as it happens to be the most widely used theory. 
Pen, Stevens and Chamberlain models are briefly touched upon in subs-
équent discussion. 
Bilatéral Monopoly Theory 
This is an attempt by the economists to picture the employer as 
a monopsonist, or a sole buyer of labour, having to deal with a union 
which is a principal seller of labour, wielding monopoly power. The 
setlement of wages under such bi-lateral monopoly conditions is shown 
in figure 1. Since there is no way of knowing the relative bargaining 
strength of the parties, commensurate with their monopoly power, the 
figure shows the possible range, Wm to Wu, within which wage settlement 
will take place with a possibility of employment going up to a maximum 
of Q3. The range is determined by the intersection of MC and MRP, 
read off the demand curve, ARP, for the union wage demand Wu ; and 
read off the supply curve, AC for the management wage offer, Wm. The 
employment level will be maximum possible, i.e. Q3. The diagram also 
indicates two other positions. Under the first one a strong union bargains 
with a weak management, taking MMRP marginal curve to MRP as its 
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FIGURE 1 
Seulement of Wages Under 
Bi-lateral Monopoly Conditions 
Ql Q2 Q3 Employment 
demand curve which intersects with MC to give Wu wage seulement 
(read off MRP). Under the second possibility, a strong management 
bargains with a weak union, equating, MMC, marginal curve to MC with 
MRP to give a possible wage settlemeiit at Wm. 
It may be observed that the maximum profit position, MRP equating 
MC, gives maximum employment Ievel ; whereas under strong union 
position it is d and under strong management position it is Q2. Supposedly 
a mature bargaining relationship makes union-management coopération 
possible to obtain maximum employment Ievel, Q3. But even then wage 
seulement remains indeterminate, within the range Wm to W«. 
Bilatéral monopoly theory, although explained with a maximum 
effort to economize space, has brought out the salient features which are : 
(1) détermination of a range within which wage seulement will take 
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place ; (2) possibility of a labour-management coopération in maximizing 
employment level. Discounting the well-known limitations of the bilateral-
monopoly model, 6 one must admit that it tells us nothing about worker 
motivation in joining a union, structure of collective bargaining, rôle of 
extraneous factors in the resolution of conflict and the content of agree-
ment with regard to non-wage issues. Yet this theory has long been 
accepted as a theory of collective bargaining. Its contribution in identifying 
the éléments of bargaining power over wage issues is valuable and must 
be incorporated in a unified theory which will be required to produce 
explanation for the entire process of collective bargaining, not just one 
or two facets of it. 
Theory Vs. Practice 
Discourse on collective bargaining or for that matter, on any aspect 
of industrial relations, has traditionally been descriptive. Analytical and 
conceptual attempts hâve also been made, which on account of their 
infrequency and unpopularity with the ' practitioners ' and policy-makers, 
stand out like the American tourists in a crowded ïndian bazaar. Conse-
quently, collective bargaining remains an exclusive domain of the practi-
tioner. The question arises, why does a union or management negotiator, 
or a governmeint conciliation officer, an arbitration board chairman, or 
€ven a student of collective bargaining need a theory ? The justification 
for a theory per se is not lacking. It is needed because it has an enormous 
explanatory power and it is predicative. Remove theoretical body from any 
physical science such as physics, chemistry or biology, and what remains 
is utterly limp and barely classificatory material. According to Professer 
Tripp there has existed an intellectual frustration, at least since World 
War II, over the lack of a theory of collective bargaining. The problem 
has been twofold : « (a) that collective bargaining has been a pragmatic 
or applied field which was foreign to if not in actual contradiction of 
the laws of économies, and (b) that where scholarship was being devoted 
to collective bargaining the efforts produced largely scattered spot material, 
6 « In a traditional bilatéral monopoly model such as Fellner's, it is assumed 
that the parties to the relationship are aware of the appropriate demand and supply 
fonctions. In typical union-management contract negotiations, it is unrealistic to 
assume that both parties in the initial stages of negotiation share a common view 
of thèse functions. » B.D. MALBRY, Labor Relations and Collective Bargaining, New 
York, The Ronald Press Company, 1966. 
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case studies, unrelated observations or spéculations, with little or no 
systematic framework of interrelated propositions or operational hypo-
thèses. > 7 
Foregoing survey of existing theoretical concepts may perhaps 
indicate that contemporary literature on collective bargaining is not 
really bereft of theoretical basis. In fact, there are other relevant théories 
not entirely covered in the above survey, which directly bear upon the 
formulation of a unified theory of collective bargaining. Thèse are 
managerial and labour movement théories. The fundamental problem, 
therefore, is one of intégration, and logical consistency. Chamberlain 
provided three théories of collective bargaining : marketing, governmental 
and managerial. He made no effort to cast them into one theoretical 
framework. His marketing theory was rejected by Allan Flanders for the 
same reasons he discarded Webbs' treatment of collective bargaining as 
an économie institution. To Flanders, rulemaking characteristic of collect-
ive bargaining is vital. « Chamberlain's governmental theory on the other 
hand, by placing ail the emphasis on the procédural rules of collective 
bargaining appears to be quite unnecessarily restrictive and is not incom-
patible with a unitary view of the institution which also includes the 
substantive rules made by the parties for regulating their market rela-
tions. » 8 Thus the only theory left with a high degree of validity is 
managerial theory. Unions, despite their lack of intention to take-over 
management, are bound to involve themselves in managerial functions. 
Such a stage in the historical development of collective bargaining may 
not be reached until the marketing and governmental stages of ' sale 
of labour ' and ' procédure for settling disputes ', are not gone through. 
Thus what is lacking in Chamberlain's scheme is a unitary view on 
collective bargaining. His trichotomy of views does not provide answers 
to what a theory of collective bargaining must explain. Somewhat différent 
conceptual intégration of collective bargaining theory with an accepted 
theory of the labour movement and a theory of the firm is also missing 
from Chamberlain's théories. Subsequently, he reduced the stress on 
conceptual significance of his théories and referred to them as * three 
viewpoints '. 9 
7
 L. Reed TRIPP, « Collective Bargaining Theory » in Labor Management and 
Social Policy, éd. G.G. Somers, Madison, The University of Wisconsin Press, 1963. 
8 Allan FLANDERS, op. cit. 
9 Allan FLANDERS, op. cit., p. 20. 
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Constructs of a New Theory 
An integrative approach in collective bargaining theory is possible 
intemally in the Chamberlain's context and also externally, in relation 
to théories of the labour movement and théories of the firm. In the 
proceeding section, the survey of bilatéral monopoly theory and Cham-
berlain model has underlined the following areas of concern : 
(a) Existing théories of collective bargaining are essentially partial 
théories. They explain only part of the phenomenon of collective bar-
gaining. 
(b) There is a semantic and definitional problem. In most cases 
it is not defined as to what a theory of collective bargaining is expected 
to explain. Is it expected to explain structural, functional or behavioral 
aspects of collective bargaining ? Is collective bargaining synonymous to 
negotiation ? Should the theory concern itself with problems of analyzing 
behavior in union and management organizations including motives, 
activities and interactions ? What about the problems of conflict between 
personality and organization and inter-organizational conflicts ? How is 
a theory of negotiation différent in its intent and scope from a theory of 
collective bargaining ? What ought to be the conceptual relationship 
between a theory of collective bargaining and a theory of industrial rela-
tions ? The quest for a unified theory of collective bargaining must 
therefore begin by tackling the problem of définitions and by sorting out 
some basic taxonomical issues. It need hardly be overemphasized that 
formulation of hypothèses, methods of operationalism and research in 
this area are generally difficult on account of vague définitions. Studies 
in the area of collective bargaining are by and large descriptive case 
studies, unrelated to theoretical concepts. 
(c) There is a basic problem of prédiction in social sciences. 
Most propositions are probabilistic in nature. Théories surveyed in 
the previous section, with the exception of Chamberlain's tri-later view-
point are théories of negotiation not of collective bargaining. They predict 
ldttle or nothing about the probabilistic nature of collective bargaining. 
They indicate a range of indeterminancy in wage settlement through 
labour-management negotiations. Thèse prédictions need to be supple-
mented with other prédictions about the possible changes in the nature, 
function and structure of collective bargaining. 
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Définitions 
Clarity in defining objects, events, processes and concepts is essential 
in the formulation of hypothèses and théories. Définitions hâve extensional 
and intensional features and it is incumbent upon a theory to designate 
clearly the objects which hâve such features. Words hâve intentional 
meanings unless defined in terms of conceptual realities. In industrial 
relations there is a fair amount of vagueness in differentiating concepts 
such as negotiation, bargaining, collective bargaining and industrial rela-
tions itself. Consequently, théories formulated to explain negotiational 
process are taken to be théories of collective bargaining. Similarily., little 
distinction is made in the conceptual requirement of a theory of industrial 
relations vis-a-vis a theory of collective bargaining. Obviously thèse 
concepts hâve not been defined in their extensional context. 
Collective bargaining is a rule-making process, on a private and 
voluntary basis. It is a process of conflict resolution and a mechanism 
for décision making : an instrument of social justice. It requires certain 
environmental preconditions such as a capitalisme or a socialistic System 
of production, with a high degree of growth potential and éléments of 
économie freedom. Secondly, it also requires a démocratie political System 
which permits existence of pressure groups, lobbying activities and 
pluralistic System of decision-making. Thirdly, a viable légal framework 
is necessary to protect the existence of various interest groups which 
may interact in a relatively equalized power context. Where thèse prere-
quisites do not exist or exist in a modified context, we hâve either 
political action instead of collective bargaining or a modified version 
of collective bargaining. 
The process of negotiating an agreement is often described as 
collective bargaining. This is, to say the least, a very narrow définition. 
As mentioned earlier, collective bargaining has three dimensions : 
( 1 ) employée organization into unions, duly certified as bargaining agents 
plus employer or employer associations, if any ; (2) process of negotiating 
an agreement, in good faith ; (3) socio-economic and légal sanctions in 
the forms of permissive strikes or lockouts. Sometimes collective bar-
gaining is described as a continuing process as it involves settling of 
grievances in line with the procédure agreed to in the existing contract. 
This définition, on the other hand, is unnecessarily diffused and confusing. 
For how else can one define industrial relations which is an on-going 
process and a system with identifiable characteristics. In other words, 
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adding a fourth dimension to collective bargaining — namely, adminis-
tration of contract — would define the scope and content of industrial 
relations. Alton Craig has defined industrial relations as « that complex 
of private and public activities, operating in an environment, which is 
concerned with the allocation of rewards to employées for thèse 
services. » 10 This définition is comprehensive and in Une with the one 
developped hère. 
Théoretical Intégration 
In most academically respectable disciplines, there is an integrated 
body of theory. Théories of higher order and rigor are generally formul-
ated, utilizing the tributes received from théories of narrower application 
and scope. In économies, for instance, Keynes gênerai theory of employ-
ment is squarely based upon théories of saving, consumption, interest and 
investment. In industrial relations no formai attempt of this kind has 
been made, although, as mentioned earlier, there are fragments of partial 
théories which may not defy a logical intégration. 
In this section, I will identify conceptual output, in part or in 
totality, from three différent théories which will become input in a pro-
posed theory of collective bargaining. Thèse théories and model are : 
Commons theory of the labour movement ; Marginalist-Behavioralist 
théories of the firm ; Stevens-Somers model. 
COMMONS' THEORY OF THE LABOUR 
MOVEMENT : — 
Perhaps the most plausible explanation of trade union development, 
almost universally applicable, is John R. Commons concept of expanding 
markets. In his article on « American Shoemakers : 1648-1895 », 
Commons has established a cause and effect relationship in an integrated 
fashion, proceeding with the extent of market expansion, advancing stages 
of production, dichotomy of interest, outgrowth of compétitive menaces 
to the final création of protective organizations. 
« It was the widening out of markets with their lower levels of com-
pétition and equality, but without any changes in the instruments of 
production, that destroyed the previous identity of master and journ-
10 Alton W. CRAIG, «A Model for the Analysis of Industrial Relations Sys-
tems, » a paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science 
Association, Ottawa, June, 1967. 
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eyman cordwainers and split their community of interest into the 
modem alignment of employers association and trade union. The 
struggle occured, not as a resuit of changes in tools or methods of 
production, but directly as a resuit of changes in markets. » U 
This cause-effect relationship is not the only plausible dimension 
of Commons theory of labour movement but there are reasons to believe 
that it also has prédictive capability. For instance, it can be established 
that a historical and empirical varification of this theory in terms of 
labour, product and money market expansion exdsts in the rise of Canadian 
international trade unionism. It is interesting to note that Professor 
Tripp's theory of collective bargaining draws heavily from Gommons 
concept of expanding market. 12 Perhaps it is the potency of this concept 
and its historical vérification in U.S., Canada and England which made 
Commons theory préférable in comparison with others like Tannenbaum 
and Hoxie. For instance, the phenomenon of expanding markets when 
examined in a historical perspective, provides an explanation to the 
doctrine of classical liberalism. The philosophy of liberalism found its 
logical expression in laissez-faire. One may pause for a moment and 
question as to why philosophy of liberalism permeated the political and 
économie structure of English society ? Is it not due to the fact that 
England at that time experienced a spectacular growth and expansion 
of The Empire and The Markets ? While this widely accepted doctrine 
of laissez-faire brought liberalism in économie sphère it also helped in 
establishing individual rights, vis-a-vis the crown. Commons has discussed 
at length in his Légal Foundation of Capitalization as to how the monarch's 
unlimited sovereignty was curtailed through rent bargain, price bargain 
and wage bargain. While one feels convinced of the far reaching influences 
of expanding markets, this concept per se does not constitute a theory 
of collective bargaining. It certainly is a theory of the labour movement 
and explains a great deal of socio-economic and power structure changes 
in an industrializing society. For our purposes it explains the development 
and structure of the trade union movement but says nothing définitive 
about the outeome of a negotiation or the pattern of conflict resolution. 
To seek answers to the latter components of collective bargaining theory, 
it is considered necessary to find supplementary concepts in the other 
two théories. 
11
 John R. COMMONS, «American Shoemakers : 1648-1895», Quarterly Jour-
nal of Economies. 
12
 L. Reed TRIPP, « Theory of Collective Bargaining, » op. cit. 
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MARGINALIST-BEHAVIORALIST THÉORIES OF THE FIRM : — 
As we explored the reasons for the development of the trade union 
movement in the phenomenon of expanding markets, so must we find 
theoretieal basis of management resistence to unionism, both in économie 
and behavioral terms. Managements' resistence to unions in économie 
terms is relatively simple to explain by resorting to the marginalist formula. 
Economists built their theory of priées, cost, wages, and employment 
on the postulate that management wishes to maximize money profits. 
The guiding principle for an individual employer, under compétitive 
condition, is to expand his output (by employing additional units of land, 
labour and capital) to the point where his marginal cost becomes equal 
to his marginal revenue. This will ensure maximum output and money 
profits. The bid for maximization would therefore maintain a continuous 
pressure on the employer to eut costs on wages, rent and interests. The 
présence of union in the plant will tend to frustrate management goal 
to reduce costs at the expense of wages. Hère lies the marginalist explan-
ation of management resistence to unions. However, a great lacuna in 
the assumption about management tendency to maximize, leading to a 
large body of abstract theorizing, was later discovered when the econ-
omists realized that it had not been tested for its universal application. 
Behavioral scientists, in particular, attacked économie theorizing in this 
area on the ground that it is based on profit maximization hypothesis 
which is not adequately verified. Its validity, legitimacy or usefulness 
dépends on the percentage of employers who operate their business on 
the sole objective of profit maximization. Behavioralist insist that operat-
ing a business is a complex organizational (bureaucratie) and decision-
making process. Profit maximization in this context is no longer a tenable 
hypothesis. What becomes an important and perhaps a primary goal in 
management, is coordination and intégration of human effort. The business 
objective in such behavioral context is satisfactory profits rather than 
maximum profits. 
It is not intended to résolve marginalist-behavioralist controversy 
hère.13 What remains a common explanatory phenomenon in thèse 
opposing points of view is management resistence to unions. Under the 
marginalist scheme, unions are resisted on account of management cost-
consciousness ; under the behavioralist contention, it is the présence of 
13
 For an excellent coverage of this controversy, see Fritz MACHLUP, «Théo-
ries of the Firm : Marginalist, Behavioral, Managerial, » The American Economie 
Review, Volume LVII, No. 1, March 1967. 
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unions which tends to obstruct management decision-making in such 
matters as hdring, promotion, seniority, work-sharing, layoffs and others. 
Both thèse views are essential for theorizing in the area of collective 
bargaining. Rationale for union existence is to be found not only in its 
monetary objectives (wage incréments) but also in its désire to regulate 
matters of industrial jurisprudence. Management resistence to each of 
thèse union objectives is theoretically explanable in marginalist and 
behavioralist schools of though, respectively. I do not visualize that 
either of thèse camps will score a complète victory over the other. 
Behavior of the firm must be explained in its maximization functlon as 
well as in its decision-making rôle. There is, however, a wide scope 
for refinement and conditional statements, introducing such variables 
as size of the firm, degree of bureaucracy, compétitive nature of the 
markets etc. Economists and behavioral scientists must cease to make 
universal generalizations which would also explain, for our purposes, 
varying degrees of management resistence to unions. 
Thus far we hâve outlined, in theoretical terms, union and manage-
ment goals and objectives. We hâve also noticed an inhérent élément of 
clash or conflict in thèse respective goals. Logically, what needs to be 
explained next is the mechandcs of resolving conflict which is accomplished 
through negotiations. Happily, there are a number of theoretical develop-
ments to explain the stratégies and the underlying intra and inter-person-
ality conflict-choice situations. One of them referred to earlier is the 
Stevens-Somers model. 
THE STEVENS-SOMERS MODEL 
Karl M. Stevens explains bargaining equilibrium between labour 
and management by using a conflict-choice model. The basis of this 
model is a hypothesis that « the strength of an individual's tendency 
to avoid a négative goal is a decreasing function of his distance from 
the goal. » 14 G. G. Somers applies this model to explain a worker's intra-
personality conflict.15 He uses an avoidance — avoidance type of model 
14 Karl M. STEVENS, Strategy and Collective Bargaining Negotiation, New 
York, McGraw-Hill Book Co. Inc., 1963. 
15
 Gerald G. SOMERS, « Bargaining Power and Industrial Relations Theory, » 
a paper presented to Industrial Relations Theory Seminar, University of Wiscon-
sin, 1964. 
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which means that in Figure 2, both the goals are négative. On account 
of his insecurity gradient AA, the worker tends to avoid goal A or job 
termination. He would also tend to avoid goal B or maximum efficiency 
because of his withholding gradient BB. At point Di, the worker is in 
equilibrium position. He is exchaging ODi units of efficiency for equal 
units of security or in other words, his strength of the tendency to avoid 
goal A is equal to his strength of the tendency to avoid goal B, measured 
by OE. If the worker is temporarily displaced from position D t to D2, 
his strength of the tendency to avoid goal A v/ill be greater than his 
strength of the tendency to avoid Goal B (OE > OG). Therefore the 
worker will move toward goal B till he returns to his original position, Di. 
It may be noticed that DiF indicates withholding and is therefore a 
measure of tension, frustration or conflict. In an idéal situation AA will 
shift to A'A', indicating no withholding, no job termination and complète 
acceptance of goal B (i.e. maximum efficiency). 
Similar avoidance — avoidance type of models may be used to 
explain the equilibrium positions of union and management. For example, 
the two négative goals for the management will be strike cost and loss 
of profits or autonomy, if the union demands are to be accepted for the 









Goal B G 
Strength of B 
tendency to 
avoid ° 
D 2 D x 
Efficiency Units of Labour (Distance) 
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seulement at the management terms. Thus the avoidance model as applied 
to both sides of the negotiating table, détermines the bargaining power 
of the respective parties. Actual settlement or the resolution of inter-
personality conflict takes place at the point where both sides reach a 
consonance in their respective conflict equilibria. 
Various attempts hâve been made to precisely explain the point 
of settlement in the bargaining process. Karl M. Stevens tends to favor 
the avoidance — avoidance model as against the nonconflict choice 
approach in Pen's theory. According to him, « the avoidance — avoidance 
model actor in any event goes on negotiating until the necessary and 
sufficient conditions for agreement are met. While negotiating, he con-
fronts this choice : (a) accept bargaining opponent's proposai, or (b) 
insist upon his own position. He does not simply elect either of thèse 
goals ; he is conflicted — which yields an equilibrium position such as 
Di, the rate he would be willing to accept if there were some way to do so. 
The negotiation process involves a resolution of this intra-personal 
conflict in the context of an inter-personal conflict. » 16 
Discussion on relevant theoretical bases in this section rnay be 
summarized by suggesting that a comprehensive theory of collective 
bargaining must be squarely based on the deductive and inductdve results 
of the following three conceptual frameworks : (1) Common's theory 
of the labour movement explaining the rationality in worker's décision 
to join a union ; and union behavior and objectives with regard to 
monetary and non-monetary issues. (2) Marginalist-Behavioralist théories 
of the firm used in our context to explain management résistance to 
unions on économie and behavioral grounds or more specifieally in terms 
of maximization and satisfying functions. (3) Stevens-Somers model 
explaining the mechanism and output of conflict resolution through union-
management negotiation. 
Theory and Operationalism 
The function of a theory of collective bargaining should be to explain 
in operational terms : ( 1 ) the logic of collectivity as expressed in the 
16 Karl M. STEVENS, op. cit., p. 150. For other approaches to the explanation 
of negotiation process see J. CROSE, « A Theory of the Bargaining Process » (Ame-
rican Economie Review, March 1965), pp. 55, 67-94 and R.E. WALTON, and R.B. 
MCKERSIE, A Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations, New York, McGraw-
Hill, 1965. 
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formation of unions ; (2) management resistence to unions ; (3) struc-
ture of bargaining relationship, i.e. local, régional, national or industry 
wide ; (4) the type of collective bargaining relationship over a continuum 
of perfect harmony to hostility — defining the degree of conflict ; and 
(5) process of collective bargaining as defined by the mechanism of a 
third party intervention, work stoppage and emergency settlement ; and 
(6) the outcome of negotiation or content of an agreement. 
(a) A theory of collective bargaining must throw some light on 
the motives of workers to form a collectivity. (b) Why does bargaining, 
at times, take place at the local levels, popularly known as decentralized 
bargaining, and at others, in a fairly centralized manner, at national or 
industry level ? In other words, does it explain the structure of collective 
bargaining at a given point in time, or its évolution historically ? (c) It 
must also explain the changing hierarchy of préférences in union demand 
for économie and non-economic concessions. It must explain the interplay 
of political and power struggle vis-a-vis matters of wage incréments. 
This includes intra-union political struggle between rival groups and 
between membership and the union leaders, (d) The basis of conflict and 
the ways of its possible resolution, including labour-management nego-
tiational stratégies, bluffs, horse-trading as well as the évolution of public 
policy in terms of conciliation and emergency settlement procédures 
must be accounted for. (e) Lastly, the theory must explain the outcome 
of collective bargaining, that is, the actual content of the agreement. 
This includes not only the substantive issues such as wages and fringe 
benefits, but also procédural matters. 
How can our discussion on theoretical intégration help us in defining 
concepts operationally which may explain the above dimensions of collec-
tive bargaining ? Operationalism is not a prerequisite in the formulation 
of théories. But non-operational concepts used in a theory will render it 
non-verifiable. Such seems to be the fate of a number of théories in 
industrial relations, which explains the nature of non-theory based research 
and lack of prédiction or probablistic statements. 
I am presenting below four causal or independent variables, at 
least three of them hâve been derived from the integrated System of 
théories covered in this section. Thèse independent variables are expected 
to explain changes, both on a historical and futuristic perspective in the 
six dimensions of collective bargaining outlined above. They are thus, 
our dépendent variables. (See Table 1). 
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TABLE 1 
THEORETICAL ANTÉCÉDENTS AND CAUSAL RELATIONSHIP 
IN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING THEORY 
Theoretical 
Antécédents 
Commons theory of 
the labour movement 
Indépendant Variables 
Expansion of markets 
Dépendent Variables 
Degree of unionism 
Marginalist-Behavioralist Management maximiza-
theories of the firm tion satisfying function 




Steven Somers Model Power as a negotiational Type of collective bargaining 
base relationship and the content 
of collective agreements 
Commons légal frame-
work of capitalism 
Légal foundations 
of conflict resolution 
Process of conflict reso-
lution. Type of collective 
bargaining (degree of 
hostility) 
Beyond the establishment of tbis cause and effect relationship, there 
is further need for expressing thèse ten variables in operational terms. 
Some of thèse may even lend themselves to a certain degree of quanti-
fication with a possibility of indicating négative or positive relationship 
between each of the four independent variables and their correlates in the 
list of dépendent variables. 
Expansion of markets is a concept which is applicable to product, 
labour and capital at each one of the seven phases of development des-
cribed by Commons. 17 In a historical perspective, they were instrumental 
in determining the process of production and giving rise to 'compétitive 
menaces'. Such menaces, in the early itinérant and personal stages of 
market expension, affected both master and journeymen alike, and it 
was only in the latter stage that craft gild emerged as a protective organi-
zation. Journeymen, for the first time, identified their interests separately 
17 l ) itinérant; 2) personal; 3) local; 4) waterways ; 5) highways ; 6) rail; 
and 7) world., John R. COMMONS, «American Shoemakers : 1648-1895,» op. cit. 
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from merchant-master when market expansion became possible through 
waterways and gave rise to compétitive menaces in the form of « scabs » 
and interstate producers. This was the embryonic stage of trade union 
development. Subséquent stages of market expansion are historically 
correlated, in the American expérience, with the rise of unionism which 
had gradually increasing scope from the local to the régional, national 
and international organizations. Thus in the Common's framework, the 
concept of expanding markets, as a causal variable was well defined and 
explained the development of trade unionism as well as its structure. 
However, there was no measurement criterion involved in defining, for 
instance, the highway or railway phases of market expansion. Rostowian 
stages of development, on the other hand, are not only historically based 
but hâve also quantitative criteria such as rates of saving and investment 
as a percentage of GNP, typical for each stage of development. Possibi-
lity of introducing such conceptual preciseness in Commons framework 
exists. In fact, researchers who hâve correlated GNP with trade union 
membership over time hâve not acknowledged their intellectual debt to 
Commons for his historical account of expanding markets and trade 
union growth. GNP in their case is a quantitative proxy variable for 
expanding markets. Any other économie indicators such as volume of 
exports and imports, capital inflows and outflows and labour mobility 
across the boundaries may also be used as quantitative expression of 
expanding markets. However, thèse quantitative variables hâve not been 
used for explaining the degree of unionization or the centralized or de-
centralized structure of collective bargaining. Quantitative studies attempt-
ing to relate labour and product market conditions with the structure of 
collective bargaining do exist. In short, there is adéquate theoretical 
justification in establishing expansion of markets as a causal force in 
determining union growth and structure of collective bargaining. But it 
does not stand to reason that other aspects of collective bargaining could 
also be explained in terms of expanding markets. Professor Tripp's theory 
of collective bargaining for instance, crédits it with sufficient exploratory 
power, extending it to Perlman's theory of job consciousness, so that a 
quest for additional independent variables is abandoned. 
Management satisficing function is the central concept of the be-
havioral theory of the firm, discussed earlier. This has never been used 
in collective bargaining theory or for that matter not sufficiently oper-
ationalized to be a useful guidepost for statisticians and data collectors. 
However, for the purpose of our theory, it is indispensable in explaining 
management resistence to unionism. It is not a static notion or constant 
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in its application. Managements cost consciousness and its traditional 
sensé of protecting prérogatives, change from time to time and from 
corporation to corporation. Management hardline policy toward unions 
is a reflection of this function and among other things, varies according 
to the gênerai économie performance at the time. 
As expansion of markets defines union growth, management satis-
ficing function détermines their résistance to unions. There is an élément 
of interdependence in thèse two variables ; that is, extending markets 
affect managements maximization and satisficing behavior and contrari-
wise extension of markets, to an extent, is determined by management 
cost consciousness, sensé of compétition and urge to maximize. Interplay 
of thèse two variables provide the backdrop for bargaining tactics and 
negotiational strategy which in turn define the contents of an agreement. 
A third exploratory variable in our theoretical framework is power as 
a negotiational base. Power has been defined by sociologists in a variety 
of ways ; according to Robert Dubin it is : 
« The importance that conséquences of action hâve in a social relation-
ship. If the conséquences of an act are highly important for everyone 
involved in the act, then the actor is powerful. Power relations 
resuit from the exécution of functions that are necessary to the 
social relationship. 18 
The context in which it is used hère is no différent from the usage 
in Steven's model. Type of bargaining relationship or the degree of hosti-
lity involved as well as the final outcome of the bargaining process are 
explained by the bargaining power of the protagonists. The concept is 
quite useful and defensible in a definitional sensé, although quantification 
of withholding function or degree of militancy is still a problem.19 
Interdependence and conceptual intégration of thèse three explo-
ratory variables is significant for a theory of collective bargaining as 
each of them is derived from widely accepted but hitherto unrelated 
théories of unionism, management and negotiation. Jointly and severally 
they explain five of the six dépendent variables. Process of collective 
18 Robert DUBIN, « Power and Union-Management Relations, » Administrative 
Science Quarterly, lune, 1957, pp. 60-61. 
19 For various approaches to quantification see S. HAMEED, «Theory and Re-
search in the field of Industrial Relations, » British Journal of Industrial Relations, 
July 1967. 
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bargaining or its statutory régulation including the right to organize, cer-
tification procédure i.e. détermination of an appropriate bargaining agent, 
decertification, conciliation, médiation, arbitration and inquiry need to 
be explained in terms of légal foundations that a society chooses to 
establish. What philosophical, économie or political doctrines give rise 
to a unique system of statutory régulations of collective bargaining 
should be the subject of a separate study on jurisprudence. For our 
purposes it is an independent variable, logically linked in our System of 
three variables already defined. Where and how does it link ? 
Légal institutions and processes, in Commons terminology, are 
« going concerns. » They are affected, not determined, by the pheno-
menon of expanding markets like any other économie or political insti-
tution. According to Commons, it is in the expanding markets that the 
evdls of compétition take place ;20 and it is from hère that the « me-
naces » hâve to be removed through the instrumentality of protective 
organizations and protective législation. The law-givers generally respond 
to the changing features of a society when this change is not in line 
with the predetermined values of the society. The change itself, among 
a million other factors, may hâve been introduced as a resuit of migration 
(labour market expansion) or trade (product market expansion) or in 
modem terms, through mass-media which transmit ideas within and 
without a national territory. The philosophy of liberalism and its logical 
extension, laissez-faire, directly or indirectly, gave birth to a host of 
statutory régulations in the Western capitalist world. Régulation of inter-
state commerce and anti-trust laws are early examples of légal constraints 
within which labour-management relations were being shaped. 
For lack of space hère, I may conclude by briefly emphasizing that 
expansion of markets is a very potent variable in our scheme. Concep-
tually, it is related with management satisficing function and also indirectly 
with power and negotiational strategy. Its relationship with légal founda-
tions of conflict resolution, in Common's treatment, is well documented 
to need no further discussion. A note of warning is necessary hère as one 
may tend to use the phenomenon of expanding markets as the only causal 
variable, defining the remaining three exploratory variable and hence 
ail the dépendent variables as well. This is not the case as ail the four 
independent variables in our System, including expansion of markets, are 
20 K. PARSENS, «The Basis of Common's Progressive Approach to Public Po-
licy, » in G.G. Somers (éd.), Labor Management and Public Policy, op. cit. 
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déterminée exogenously. It is only the interdependence and intégration 
which is emphasized hère. Thus our theory is broad based compared vvith 
Professor Tripp's theory. It is more integrated than Chamberlain's and 
limited in scope than the Dunlopian framework which purports to explain 
the entire industrial relations system. 
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UNE THÉORIE DE LA NÉGOCIATION COLLECTIVE 
Une rétrospective des écrits sur les diverses théories de la négociation collective 
révèle d'une façon inquiétante qu'il n'existe aucune clarté eu égard au rôle, aux 
éléments et aux exigences de la négociation collective. La plupart des théories dites 
de régimes de négociation collective sont plutôt des théories de négociation ; la 
négociation proprement dite n'est qu'un élément d'un régime de négociation collec-
tive. Les théories suivantes sont partielles ou inadéquates : ( 1 ) la théorie du 
monopole bilatéral; (2) le modèle Pen ; (3) le modèle Steven-Somers. Le modèle 
Chamberlain s'avère plus complet, quoiqu'il ne fait pas le lien entre ces trois 
théories de base : théories du marketing, théories gouvernementales et directoriales. 
L'intégration des divers éléments d'une théorie d'un régime de négociation 
collective est possible en regroupant les éléments exposés par Chamberlain ; le 
contexte d'un tel régime pourrait être expliqué à partir des théories du mouvement 
ouvrier et des théories de l'entreprise. 
LES JALONS D'UNE NOUVELLE THÉORIE 
Une théorie du régime de négociation collective devrait expliquer en termes 
opérationnels (1) la logique qui pousse une collectivité à se grouper et à former 
un syndicat; (2) la résistance des patrons face aux syndicats; (3) la structure 
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du palier de négociation, i.e. local, régional, national ou industriel ; (4) le type 
de relations qui existent dans la négociation, en exposant le continuum allant 
d'une harmonie parfaite à l'hostilité — en précisant le degré de conflit ; (5) le 
processus de déclenchement des mécanismes tels que l'intervention d'un tiers, l'arrêt 
de travail, les règlements d'urgence des différends ; (6) et le résultat de la négo-
ciation ou le contenu de l'accord. 
L'utilisation de termes opérationnels dans l'élaboration d'une théorie n'est 
pas un prérequis, mais s'avère nécessaire pour rendre cette théorie vérifiable. 
L'auteur rend son schéma opérationnel en établissant quatre variables indé-
pendantes ou causales. 
Celles-ci doivent expliquer les changements passés et futurs qui se produisent 
dans les six dimensions déjà présentées : ces dernières constituant donc ses variables 
dépendantes. 
(a) L'expansion des marchés explique le degré de syndicalisation, et la structure 
des syndicats et de leurs négociations ; 
(b) La fonction de satisfaction au désir des patrons de maximiser les profits 
expliquent leur résistance face aux syndicats ; 
(c) les lois visant à résoudre les conflits expliquent la procédure des règlements 
de conflits et le type de négociation (degré d'hostilité) ; 
(d) le pouvoir de négociation rend compte du type de relation qu'on retrouve dans 
la négociation collective et le contenu des conventions collectives. 
Ces dix variables peuvent être davantage exprimées en termes opérationnels, 
puisqu'il est possible de quantifier certaines d'entre elles, et d'établir une relation 
positive ou négative entre les variables indépendantes et leurs variables dépen-
dantes correspondantes. 
La théorie d'un régime de négociation collective qui se baserait sur l'inter-
dépendance et l'intégration conceptuelle de ces variables exploratoires serait fort 
valable : en effet chacune de ces variables provient de théories du syndicalisme, 
de management et de la négociation, qui sont acceptées en général, mais qui 
n'ont jamais été mises en relation les unes avec les autres. 
Nous nous devons de souligner l'importance de l'expansion des marchés 
comme variable indépendante, à cause de sa relation avec la fonction de satisfaction 
des patrons, et indirectement avec le pouvoir et la stratégie de négociation. 
Toutefois une mise en garde s'avère nécessaire contre l'emploi exclusif de cette 
variable comme facteur causal, puisqu'on se doit d'insister sur l'interdépendance 
des variables et sur leur intégration. 
